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Introduction:
Although it may be acknowledged that 'structural adjustment programmes' have
achieved some success in revitalising economie growth in Africa, when such basic
indicators as poverty and food security of the African population are used as yard-
sticks, the record of more than 15 years of experimenting with various forms of
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Africa has been far from impressive.
Unfortunately Kenya is no exception. World Bank estimâtes indicate that about 30% of
the urban and no less than 50% of the rural population now live in absolute poverty.
Likewise the proportion of the food poor (unable to consume 2250 calories a day) has
increased to 37% of Kenya's total population. Clearly, we are confronted with a
détérioration, not an improvement in thèse basic development indicators.
This raises thé question if and how sap reform policies have impacted on the
determining factors of poverty and food security at household levels. The complex set
of linkages between macro adjustment and micro (food) poverty is therefore the
research focus of this paper.
Section l briefly outlines the theoretical underpinning and objectives of both IMF-
stabilization and World Bank adjustment policies.
Section 2 addresses the question how the outcomes of sap affect the food security
position of individual poor households and
Section 3 reviews expériences in the Kenyan context
L SAP's Theoretical Foundation.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are the driving forces
behind the design of 'structural adjustment programmes'.
The genera! diagnosis of IMF/WB (which is refJected in the content of saps), revolves
around the notion that macro imbalances and domestic supply constraints are at the root
of Africa's ongoing crisis. Excessive déficits in the balance of payments (external
imbalance) and the government's budget (internai disequilibrium) were caused by a
number of "external shocks" in the 1970s : the two oil crises; recession and protection
in the West ; terms of trade détérioration and higher interest rates and lower demand for
Africa's traditional experts in the world markets. These developments gave rise to a
rapid worsening of the balance of payment position in a great number of African
countries at the beginning of the 1980s.
The situation was exacerbated by the conséquences of faulty development policies on
the part of African states. These included : inappropriate exchange-rate policies
(overvaluation of the local currency) ; disincentive trade policies; heavy taxation of
farmer's output and an over-extended public - and parastatal sector. Soon, government
expenditures began to far exceed its revenues and led to serious budget déficits,
impeding the growth of domestic supplies of goods and services. Constraints on
growth of production were also thought to emanate from excessive government
régulation of and participation in economie transactions and décision making. This
caused 'distortions' in the market- and price formation processes and enhanced the
unproductive allocation of scarce resources.
Not surprisingly the proposed remedy involves a substantially reduced rôle for African
governments. Financial resources should be switched from the public to the private
sector and from consumption to productive Investments. More funds in the hands of
private producers, accompanied by a proper price incentive structure, will lead to
increased output, more employment and rising incomes for the African population. A
move to market-driven African économies is also expected to produce internationally
compétitive goods and services which contribute to the foundation of sustained, export-
led production growth. Correct price signais are crucial and assumed to effectively
work their way through all (monetized) sectors of the economy where markets of
different types ( for products, inputs, labour, land and capital) are well integrated and
operate in an efficient and smoothly manner.
In sum, these are the characteristics of the type of economie System envisagea to be the
best guarantee for sustained economie growth and welfare (World Bank;1989,1994).
The road to rectified macro imbalances and restored economie growth will necessitate
two types of policies : in the short term stabilisation measiues which are to reduce the
budget and balance of payment déficits and secondly adjustment reforms aimed at
tackling output constraints.
Stabilization (usually the realm of the IMF) is to be achieved through cuts in overall
public sector spending (including Investment) ; diminished money supply and credit
création (to curb inflation); the phasing out of subsidies (for example on food and
agricultural inputs); the retrenchment of government employees ; a genera! wage freeze
and a rise in real interest rates to stimulate savings and discourage consumption. All
these measures are meant to reduce the level of aggregatie demand in the economy.
Adjustment (usually the W.B.'s concern) is a f ar more difficult goal to achieve. Here
the aim is to restructure the economie sectors and remove the constraints to higher
productivity and efficiency of available resources. Policy instruments include: a
dévaluation of the national currency, with the twofold intention of reducing importe and
stimulating exports and thereby improving the balance of payment (the dévaluation is
also expected to increase producer priées of agricultural export tradables) ; removal of
external and internai trade barrière; an overall decontrolling of priées with the aim of
letting the market work' and the privatization or commercialization of inefficiënt public
sector enterprises (such as agricultural marketing boards).
It is important to realise that given this multitude of policies and differing concerns,
IMF and the World Bank at moments run the risk of "treading on one another's toes".
Agriculture is a case in point : to comply with IMF stablization conditionalities, African
governments may décide to reduce expenditures on rural infrastructure (on maintenance
and construction of roads for example), or on fertilizer- and credit subsidies or on
extension and research programmes. However, seen from thé World Bank's point of
view, these measures could seriously impede thé farmer's ability to respond to priée
stimuli offered by adjusment policies (in particular dévaluation). The more so because it
is widely agreed that 'environment factors' such as technology, infrastructure,
extension and reliable agrarian input delivery Systems, compared to priée incentives,
hâve shown to be more critical for enlarged agricultural output Consequenüy, the
policy of cutting this type of government expenditures for the purpose of "restoring
macro équilibra" may well work counterproductive.
In général IMF policies can be implemented relatively easy and swift, whereas the
W.B.'s task is more demanding and will take much more time as complex inter-
relations in the economie andpolitical domains are involved. The highly undesirable
result of such an a-synchronic development is that the economy is 'macro-balanced' but
at the high cost of a reduced level of production, consumption and higher
unemployment, in other words at the cost of increased poverty. This outcome is
usually refered to as 'adjustment with an inhuman face' (Cornia, G., Stewart, F. and
Jolly, R, 1987).
It is surprising to see the forthright manner with which the text-book IMF/W.B.
prescriptions are applied to African économies, notwithstahding the present limited
knowledge, in particular of the large 'informal and parallel markets' in Africa. Essential
éléments in sap thinking are priées and markets. Priée signais are assumed to stimulate
and switch production towards tradable goods and services. And markets are assumed
to be integrated and operating efficiently.
But how does sap theory compare to Africa's 'real world' conditions ?
The agricultural sector and small farmers in particular are expected to benefit from three
types of reforms : a) an end to past policies of high export taxes and overvaluation of
the national currency. Dévaluation (and the subséquent producer price rises) combined
with internai decontrolling of price formation will enhance agricultural output.; b)
improved domestic marketing of agricultural produce. The replacement of inefficiënt
parastatal marketing boards by private traders will lead to substantial lower operating
costs of marketing activities. Gains resulting from more efficiency in the marketing
sytem are assumed to also accrue to producers and c) reforms in international trade
régulations. Liberalization of import/export licensing rules, of tariffs, quota's and
subsidies are also expected to clear the way for enlarged trade and production in the
agricultural sector.
However, higher priées do not automatically reach producers in Africa. In the case of
dismantled marketing boards, private traders and transporters (often the same
individuals) usually seize the greater part of gains. And in many African countries the
process of liberalization' is slow. Boards continue to operate and contribute to the
extremely high cost structure of transactions in rural Africa.
Markets in Africa are not well integrated due to poor infra-structure and
Communications networks. This causes large priée differentials between régions which
far exceed 'normal' trade and transport margins. Especially food markets are
fragmented. Priées hère are first and foremost determined by thé whims of nature, that
is thé unpredictable rainfall conditions in Africa. Thèse cause large seasonally and
yearly variations in food supplies which in turn translate into fluctuating priées. There
is évidence that rainfall and lack of market intégration are far more important priée
determining factors than any type of pricing policy (Meilink,1987).
In the African context, sap emphasis on 'tradables' is also questionable. The principal
orientation of thé gréât majority of small farmers is towards securing household food
supply (and less with 'income maximalisation'). Staple foods in Africa (maize, millet,
sorghum and cassava) are largely non-tradables. Thèse foods often constitute a
significant share of rural market volumes and of per capita calorie consumption and
their priées are mainly determined by local and seasonal conditions.
Therefore sap-induced priée lises in tradables will largely by-pass thé majority of rural
households. The more so if one realises that in Sub Saharan Africa, only a small part
(20-25%) of thé total number of farmers is supplying thé greater part (70 -80%) of total
agricultural marketed production.
Even if farmers are prepared to switch to tradables, higher interest rates and
increasingly more difficult access to crédit and other agricultural inputs (associated with
sap reforms) will raise their production costs which may or may not be offset by a
higher producer price.
These few examples may suffîce to illustrate that 'price- and market formation' in thé
African context often takes place in a différent way than is anticipated in the sap design.
2. SAP and Food Security.
The concept of 'food security' bas a long history. It can be traced back to the 1948
Universal Déclaration of Human Rights of the United Nations (Maxwell &
Frankenberger,1995). But thé concept attained wide usage since thé World Food
Conférence in Rome in 1974, organized in response to serious global food shortages
and famines which had developed at the beginning of the 1970s.
A widely acceptée définition of food security is the World Bank's :
access by ail people at ail times to enough food for an active and healthy life.
In thé course of time food security is examinée at four différent levels: 1. national
(food production, food self-sufficiency, food imports, food aid and thé national stock
of food reserves are hère thé key issues). 2. régional (with aspects such as marketing
and distribution, surplus and déficit areas, transport and infrastructure). 3 households
(thé basic unit for production and consumption of food) and fînally 4. thé individual
members of households ( hère issues of intra-family distribution of food and gender-
related inequalities hâve grown to attract research attention).
At ail levels, three éléments of the food security concept have been emphasized:
a) supply (adéquate food availabilty originating from own or external resources);
b) distribution: (food should fiow to those in need of it ) and c) access : food might be
plentiful but out of reach for certain poor sections of thé population as a resuit of lack of
"entidéments", a concept developed by Amartya Sen (1981). Insufficient access to
'production factors' (land in particular) and/or insufficient purchasing power (money)
often cause households to go hungry despite adéquate food production at the national
level. In this way, food insecurity is defined as essentially a poverty problem.
In Africa thé poor and food- insecure are found in both rural and urban areas but thé
gréât majority is concentrated in thé rural areas and consiste mainly of small holder
farming households, pasturalists, female-headed households and landless agricultural
workers. In urban areas, thé poor mainly are self-employed in petty trade and
production in thé informai sector. Increasingly thé urban poor comprise a category
usually referred to as thé 'new poor' : thé laid-off public or private sector employees
who became redundant as a resuit of sap measures.
Their food security situation is determined by a host of inter-acting factors which range
from access to agricultural production means, market infrastructure, output- and factor
priées and other sources of income, community support mechanisms, wars and
conflicts, droughts, kinship and lineage relations, nutrition knowledge and eating
habits, food storage and processing facilities, health and sanitary conditions, décision
making on thé allocation of household expenditures, including food purchases,
women's work load and time use and environmental dégradation.
Thus thé food security concept bas developed to encompass a wide spectrum of very
diverse variables, manv of which are not directlv influenced bv sap reform measures.
The analyse of the füll impact of sap reforms on the large economie aggregates and on
the food security of various socio-economic groups would necessitate a comprehensive
econometrie model capturing and quantifying all the relevant variables. Various
versions of "computable genera! and partial equilibrium models" and "social accounting
matrices" have been developed but have met with numerous operational problems.
Moreover in the case of Sub Saharan Africa, the paucity of statiscal data also seriously
complicates such an exercise. In practice, 'second best' solutions of simpler
frameworks are used in which the key factors that play a rôle in the sap-food security
linkages are established and their workings theorized and empirically tested.
At least three sappolicy measures with food security implications can be identified: a)
currency dévaluation and export promotion; b) decontrolling of priées including
removal of subsidies and c) cuts in public sector provisions and introduction of cost
recovery charges. These will affect the following crucial déterminants of household
food security : 1. Producer- and consumer priées, 2. Sources of household income
such as wages and employaient and 3. 'Consumption' of public provisions (éducation,
health, food subsidies).
a). Dévaluation.
A relatively lower value of thé national currency will raise thé priée of tradable products
and decrease non-tradables priées. The conséquences for individual households dépend
on thé share of tradables relative to non-tradables in thé production structure and
consumption pattern of thé type of household under review. Those households who
produce largely for thé market and consume mainly non-tradables benefit most.But
those groups of households who generally buy from thé market most of the food they
consume (the urban poor, the landless and the resource-poor small farmers) will be hurt
by these food price rises. In genera! the poor spent a large proportion of their income
on food purchases. Their food demand is highly price-elastic causing food price
Üncreases to have a significant adverse impact on their real incomes.
As producers, the rural poor may benefit from dévaluation and its associated price
changes in so far as they are net producers of export or import substituting
commodities. However in a situation where the bulk of marketed produce cornes from a
small group of large farmers gains wil! be concentrated in their hands.
Moreover, as already noted, price increases of export products may not always reach
the small farmer but get diverted to the government budget The 'shadow side' of
dévaluation is that import priées of used agricultural inputs (fertilizer) will rise and may
significantly offset the gains of higher producer priées.
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On the other hand increased import food priées (wheat and rice ) may cause urban
consumers to shift to domestically produced foods of which the priées have increased
less. Such a development would benefit domestic food producers and farm labourers
(through a higher demand for labour).
b). Employment and wages.
A central sap assumption is that government policies in the past have discriminated
against the agricultural sector and turned the the terms of trade in favor of aie urban
areas. The 'urban bias' resulted in large différences between urban wages and rural
incomes. Sap seeks to redress this bias through a policy of genera! or public wage
restraint combined with retrenchement of employees in the public sector.
There is ample évidence that in the 1980s urban real wages have declined continuously
coming down to just a fraction of what they weie in the 1960s. In addition, the level of
formal sector employment in urban areas has fallen dramatically, making the number of
'priviliged' wage earners very small. The notion of an 'urban wage aristocracy' has
completely lost its validity.
Déclines in urban houshold's income levels may seriously affect their food security
situation because food requirements must be met through purchases at higher market
priées.
In the rural areas in contrast, paid labour is usually employed in thé production of
exports and food where priée increases will occur and are expected to hâve a positive
effect on employment and wages.
It is important to note that the loss of urban employment is immédiate whereas thé gain
in rural employment may or may not materialize in thé course of the adjustment
process. Employment growth has to corne from expanded production, but thé existence
of basic rigidities in thé African économies ( combined with hostile international market
conditions) are not conducive in promoting export- and overall growth.
c) Cuts in government expenditures.
Sap also implies cutbacks in government spending on social services such as health,
éducation, water, transport and réductions in subsidy transfers. However it is generally
acknowledged that expenditures on health and éducation constitute investment in human
capital which is a prerequisite for long term economie growth.
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Scaling down food and fertilizer subsidies bas a direct negative impact on the ability of
poor households to either purchase or produce the food they require. Raising fees and
the introduction of user-charges for social provisions may also threaten food security of
poor households as they may tend to sacrify food consumption in order to keep access
to thèse essential services.
However, oflen the benefits of subsidies fall to reach the poorer households because
larger farmers and better-off urban households manage to have easier access at the
expense of the poor. The poor are often forced into parallel markets where priées have
long been higher than the official ones. Consequently, removal of subsidies may not
really affect the poor.
3. Expériences in Kenya.
Kenya was one of the fïrst countries in Sub Saharan Africa to embark on a structural
adjustment programme (in 1980). The macro economie and sectoral responses to sap
reforms have been given ample research attention (Mosley,1991;Gibson,1992; Swamy,
1994). But in contrast there has been no systematic study of the effects on different
socio-économie groups. Evidence on the empirical sap-poverty linkages is often
"patchy, anecdotal and circumstantial" (Dciara & Tostensen,1995: 42). And when it
comes to the effects of sap on food security the research record leaves even more to be
desired.
Lack of 'facts and findings' generally feeds the ventilation of spéculative views
including those on what saps are doing to a country's economy and population.
In Kenya, as elsewhere, critics of sap see their Implementation as a major contributing
factor to increased poverty or even attribute all sorts of misery to sap because they
coïncide in time. Proponents are more inclined to relate continued falling standards of
living to serious govemment neglect or half-hearted commitment to sap reforms which
prevented rapid and équitable economie growth.
When looking back on 15 years of sap expérience in Kenya, it is indeed surprising to
see that so litüe has been achieved in the years up to 1993 when the govemment for the
first time effectively engaged in reform Implementation. The first 13 years of sap
Implementation in Kenya were characterized by a flat noncompliance to the agreed
IMF/WB terms or numerous reversals of reforms that had already been put in place.
Admittedly, shortcomings in sap design and timing have also played their part.
By 1992 tensions and frustration had culminated to the point that the World Bank in
consultation with other donors decided to suspend sap related crédits.
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Donors had already expressed their concerns with the lack of transparency and
accountability in the use of public funds' during the consultative meeting in November
1991 ( Swamy,1994:195).
In the first phase of sap in Kenya (1980-1984), it was agreed that reforms would be
implemented in the fields of agricultural marketing( in particular the liberalization of
maize marketing), reduced industrial protection and a better control of government
borrowing and expenditures in order to arrive at a reduced fiscal deficit
Furthermore, the introduction of real positive interest rates and a System of a crawling
peg exchange rate was agreed upon which would enhance savings and investment in
the private sectors.
But the pace of Implementation was disappointing slow especially with regard to the
politically sensitive libéralisation of maize marketing.
In the mid-1980s, the World Bank introduced sectoral-oriented adjustment loans. The
purpose of the first agricultural sector loan was to restructure the national food board
(National Cereals and Produce Board) along with other parastatels who were absorbing
large proportions of the government budget A second loan of this type concerned
reforms in the financial sector and focused on fiscal discipline of both the private banks
and the government
But again commitment on the part of the Kenyan authorities was lax and results
disappointing.
As already noted, donor's growing discontent led to the canceling of sap crédits at the
end of 1992. The arguments for this aid suspension are manifold and also instructive.
They include: poor Implementation of agreed reforms, fiscal indiscipline, rising levels
of corruption, slow reforms in the civil service and privatization of public enterprises,
lack of accountability of public enterprises, failure to establish a surportive environment
for the private sector, a slow pace of politica! reforms and the re-introduction by the
government of grain movement restrictions The reckless expansion of money supply
(by accelerating printing of bank notes) associated with the financing of the 1992
genera! élections had also raised much donor concern (Ikiara & Ndung'u,1996:5,13).
Inflation in the following year rose to the unprecedented Ie vel of almost 50%.
In 1993 the government decided to 'appease' the donors and rapidly implemented a
number of long overdue reforms. In two years time, by the end of 1995, major
progress had been made in such areas as :
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• the liberalization of imports and experts;
• removal of exchange controls and a freed exchange rate
mechanism;
• removed barriers to foreign Investments;
• dismantling of domestic price and trade controls;
• efficiënt utilization of available credit resources,
tight up with a stringent monetary policy;
• reforms and increased accountability of public enterprises;
• reducing the budget deficit (mainly through a réduction of the
number of civil servants);
As the serious commitment to adjustment starled only recenüy in 1993, the assessment
of the outcomes of sap reforms both at the macro economy level as well as at the
household levels becomes problematic !
Also the method-shortcomings of comparing "after and before" sap, with the implicit
but faulty assumption that changes in the indicators are fully attributable to sap policy
measures, makes outcome assessment a hazardous exercise.
Nevertheless, comparing the recent period of intensive adjustment with earlier years,
one is surprised to see the gloomy évolution of some of the key indicators. In the 1992-
94 period overall GDP growth dropped to a mere 1.1% down from 5% in 1985-91.
Déclines have also occured in the ratio of investment to GDP, and in growth rates of the
agricultural and manufacturing sector (Ndung'u & Khasiani,1996 :8). On the positive
side, an improvement in the budget/GDP ratio and a remarkable increase in export
growth can be observed. But imports also increased drastically.
It must be reminded that economie performance in the first years of the 1990s was also
adversely affected by rising politica! tensions and outbursts on top of a serious drought
in 1992. Therefore, relating sluggish economie growth rates in a uni-causal manner to
sap reforms would be misleading.
An important question from a (food) poverty point of view is the évolution of such
critica! indicators as employment and wage rates. Hère the link with the Implementation
of sap is more straightforward.
The success of import liberalization in Kenya has resulted in massive importation of
cheap consumer goods (clothing for example) which caused uncompetitive domestic
firms to close down or scale down their production levels and lay off a substantial
number of their employees.
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A second component of sap, cuts on public expenditure was largely effectuated through
reducing thé number of civil servants. By aie end of 1995 akeady some 25.000 civil
employees had been retrenched, mostly within the unskilled and semi-skilled
catégories. These developments contributed to Kenya's already formidable
unemployment problems. Every year the nearly 500.000 new entrants into the labour
market are confronted with a decreasing number of new jobs. Employaient in thé
informai sector bas increased dramatically and absorbed over half of the total work
force by 1994. However growth in this sector does not reflect any dynamism or
profitable expansion trends. The sector rather serves as a residual recipiënt market of
the newly unemployed in the formal sectors.
The évolution of the real wage levels in Kenya bas also been adversely affected by sap
measures. In the public sector the government held down the wage bill as a means to
reduce expenditures and the private sector showed lower real wages as their demand for
labour slackened following production cuts. During the 1980s, public real wages feil
by over 15% compared with 7,3% in the private sector (Swamy,1994: 226). They
continued to décline in the 1990-1994 period.
Kenya's ediicational system through time has expanded rapidly. Basic indicators such
as primary school enrollment rates and adult literacy are among the highest in Sub
Saharan Africa. Qovernment expenditures as a share o|jC^PJuicreïjsed from J.5% to
6.4% in the economically diffiçult period of 19J5 to 1990. Conltraiy ,tp what is pften
thought, Kenya has known a relatively high and rising share of éducation and now
faces the problem of its future financing. However is very likely that in the 1990s, the
situation has deteriorated with the introduction of higher school fees and other user
charges as a result of sap austerity measures. Given the trend of falling real incomes for
many households in Kenya, an increase in the number of school drop outs is bound to
occur.
Similar to éducation, health indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy also
have improved dramatically in Kenya. The share of GDP devoted to the health sector
has stabilized at 1.7% in the 1985-1990 period. However, in 1989 the government
introduced user-charges for in- and outpatients at all public health facilities, except
dispensaties. The 1990s saw a shift from hospital attendance to dispensaries and
smaller health centres. But also in the 1989-1992 period, the government decided to
increase the share of health in total récurrent spending from 7.6 to 8.5 %.
It may be tentatively concluded that in Kenya government expenditures directed to the
éducation and health sectors have not unduly been squeezed.
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As tioted before, priées offood ( producer- as well as consumer priées) are/important
f J J • *, 1t. L. t J f 1 T ,WM<i< * S !* ï l »J»ï . !*»itef*>J iU v Jfood secunty déterminants at household levels. In Kenya, retail priées of basic foods
increased significantiy during the 1980s : maize 24(fe, l^hèat'flöur ÏTëlb^lîl^ài^f %,
milk 162 % and tea 158$. ComparingmëpAlfin^
in the wage index ( a nse of only 134% period) its price rise^ i „ . . . . » , . i . . . . . . .
représentée a substantial
1980s. Producer priées
whüe in that period almost
f ^ ^ j| i|̂ ||%P ̂ s^ ̂  ̂ J s **
The conclusion is that the poorer households who usuaUy spent a higL~- -
their income on staple foods have suffered most
Again a tentative conclusion might be that sap measures, in dus case thé decontrolling
of domestic priée formation combined with dévaluation of the Kenyan shilling, hâve
been accompanied by a modest increase \& producer maize priées, bût much more rapid
rises in consumer (retail) priées.Whether there is causal relationship remains to seen.
This first impressionistic review of Kenya's sap expérience offers évidence for two
tentative conclusions : 1. The urban population group depending on wages and
employment in thé formai sectors of thé economy seem to be thé first to be affected by
thé short term adverse impact of sap Implementation. And 2. Inflationary food priée
rises of Kenya's staple food maize hâve negatively influenced thé food security
situation of both thé urban poor and thé net food buying households in thé rural areas.
It has also become clear that a comprehensive analysis of the sap-food security and
sap-poverty nexus is still hampered by numerous problems of a methodological,
conceptual and statistical nature. Much work remains to be done before authoritative
judgements can be made.
14
Références: ^
Cornia,iG., Jolly, R. and Stewart, F. {1987) Adjustment With A HuraanjFace. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. ,
Gibbon, P. (199,2) A FajJed.Agenda? Afncan Agriculture énder StracturaliAdjustoent
with spécial référence to Kenya and Ghana. ; M1 &>
The Journal 1ÉfPesant Studies, Vol.20, No. 1.
Ddara, O.K. and Tostensen, A (1995), The Political Economy of Poverty in Kenya,
Chr.Michelsen Institute, Norway.
Ikiara, G.K. and Ndung'u N. (1996) Employment and Labour Market During
Adjustment: The Case of Kenya. Paper for Seminar on Adjustment Policy,
Employment and Labour Market Institutions in Kenya, ILO and IPAR, 1996.
Maxwell, S. and Frankenberger, T. (1995) Household Food Security: Concepts,
Indicators, Measurements. A Tecnical Review. UNICEF and IFAD.
Meilink, H. (1987) Food Consumption and Food Priées in Kenya: a Review. Food and
Nutrition Planning Unit, Ministry of Planning and African Studies Centre, Leiden.
Report No.21.
Mosley, P. (1991) "Kenya", in MosleyJP., Harrigan, J. and Toye, J.
Aid and Power : The World Bank and Policy Based Lending, 2 vols. London:
Routledge.
Ndung'u, N. and Khasiani, S. (1996) Economie Reforms and Poverty : a Survey of
Issues. University of Nairobi, Kenya.
Sen, A. (1981) Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation.
Oxford : Clarendon Press.
Swamy, G. (1994) Kenya: patchy, intermittent commitment In: Husain, Land Faraqee
R.(eds), Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies. Washington.
15
World Bank (1989) Sub Saharan Africa: Fonn Crisis to Sustainable Growth:A Long
Term Perspective Study, Washington.
World Bank (1991) Kenya;Food and Nutrition PolicyReport No. 8351 -KE;
Washington.
World Bank (1994) Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead.
Oxford Univerity Press.
